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I N T E R R O G A T I O N S A N D P O L I C E 
D E C E P T I O N — M o r a n v. Burbine* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of 
whether police officers' failure to inform a suspect of his attorney's 
efforts to reach him would deprive the suspect of information essen-
tial to his ability to knowingly waive his fifth amendment rights 
under Miranda.1 The Court also considered the effect of the of-
ficers' misinforming the suspect's attorney about their plans to in-
terrogate the suspect. Finally, the Court decided whether the of-
ficers' actions violated the suspect's sixth amendment right to 
counsel and fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process.2 In 
Moran v. Burbine,3 the Court held that the officers' conduct did not 
violate the suspect's fifth, sixth, or fourteenth amendment rights.4 
In Moran, the police read the suspect the Miranda warnings and 
secured a waiver of these rights prior to his arraignment. 5 After 
being subjected to a custodial interrogation, the suspect signed a 
written confession. 6 Between the time the suspect was read his Mi-
randa warnings and the time he signed the confession, a public de-
fender, who was called in by the suspect's sister, telephoned the 
police to inquire into the status of the interrogation. 7 The attorney 
was informed by an unidentified officer that all interrogations had 
ceased and that the suspect would not be interrogated further until 
the next morning. In fact, police detectives continued the interroga-
tion that evening. Furthermore, the detectives failed to inform the 
defendant of the attorney's efforts to contact him. 8 This Note will 
examine the Court's opinion in Moran, addressing the constitu-
tional issues raised by the defendant and focusing on the three con-
stitutional provisions that the Court addressed. 
* Bryan L. Wright 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
s Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1142, 1145-48 (1986). 
8 106 S. Ct . 1135 (1986). 
4 Id. a t 1145, 1147-48. 
8 Id. a t 1138. 
6 Id. a t 1139. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
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I I . BACKGROUND 
A. The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-incrimination 
Miranda warnings must be given to suspects prior to custodial 
interrogations. 9 These judicially created warnings are procedural 
safeguards designed to protect a suspect's fifth amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination 1 0 during inherently coercive custodial 
interrogations. 1 1 
After receiving the Miranda warnings, a suspect may terminate 
the interrogation at any time. The interrogation must cease if the 
suspect indicates at any time prior to or during questioning that he 
wishes to remain silent, or if he indicates that he wants an attorney 
present. 1 2 The suspect may waive these rights, provided the waiver 
is voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made . 1 3 The government 
has the burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the suspect waived his rights. 1 4 Furthermore, the Court has 
indicated that certain types of police "trickery" against a suspect 
could vitiate his waiver. 1 6 
B. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 
Absent a valid waiver, a defendant has a sixth amendment r igh t 1 6 
to have an attorney present during interrogations occurring after 
the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings. 1 7 Adversarial judi-
cial proceedings commence when prosecution is undertaken by way 
of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or 
arraignment. 1 8 Once the right has attached, the police may not in-
terfere with the efforts of the attorney to represent the defendant 
during the interrogation. 1 9 
6 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-76 (1966). 
1 0 The fifth amendment provides that "nor shall any person . . . be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST, amend. V. 
1 1 Prior to the initiation of questioning, police must inform a suspect of the state's in-
tention to use his statements against him to secure a conviction. Included in the warnings 
are the rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present at the interrogation. The 
Court imposed these procedural obligations after noting that custodial interrogations are 
inherently coercive. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-70. 
1 3 Id. at 473-74; see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. All (1981). 
1 3 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. 
1 4 Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515, 523 (1986). 
1 5 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476. 
1 6 The sixth amendment provides that "the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST, amend. VI. 
1 7 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977). 
1 8 Id. at 398 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1971)). 
1 8 Maine v. Moulton, 106 S. Ct. 477, 487 (1985). 
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C. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause 
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 2 0 guaran-
tees that the government will treat its citizens with fundamental 
fairness. In the context of custodial interrogations, the Court has 
held that confessions procured by means "revolting to the sense of 
justice" cannot be used to secure a conviction.21 The Court has 
stressed that, even though the fifth amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination applies in the context of custodial interrogations, 
the Court will continue to subject confessions to the scrutiny of the 
due process clause. 2 2 
III. Moran v. Burbine 
A. Facts and Case History 
In Moran, the defendant was arrested in connection with a 
breaking and entering charge in Cranston, Rhode Island. 2 3 While 
the defendant was in custody, Cranston police officers obtained evi-
dence suggesting he might have been responsible for the murder of 
a woman in Providence. 2 4 The Providence police were notified and 
arrived at the Cranston police headquarters at approximately 6:00 
p.m. in order to question the defendant about the murder. 2 6 
That evening, the defendant's sister telephoned the public de-
fender's office to obtain legal assistance for him concerning the 
breaking and entering charge. His sister was unaware that he was a 
murder suspect. 2 6 At 8:15 p.m., an assistant public defender tele-
phoned the Cranston Police Department and stated that she would 
act as the defendant's counsel if the police intended to question 
him.27 The attorney was informed the police did not intend to ques-
tion the defendant until the next day and she was not informed that 
the Providence police were there, or that he was suspected of mur-
der.28 Less than one hour later, at approximately 9:00 p.m., the 
Providence police gave the defendant his Miranda warnings and 
questioned him about the murder. 2 0 The defendant signed three 
waivers and three confessions.3 0 The defendant did not request an 
1 0 The fourteenth amendment provides that "nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST, amend. XIV. 
" Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936). 
" Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 402 (1978). 
1 3 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1138. 
1 4 The murder occurred a few months before the breaking and entering incident. Id. 
" Id. at 1138-39. 
s e Id. at 1139. 
S7 Id. 
u Id. 
a e Id. 
30 Id. 
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attorney during the interrogations. He was, however, completely 
unaware of his sister's efforts to retain counsel for him and of the 
attorney's telephone call to the police station. 3 1 
The defendant moved to suppress the confessions. The trial court 
denied the motion and found that the defendant had validly waived 
his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel. 3 2 
The defendant was subsequently convicted of first-degree murder. 3 3 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, rejecting 
the defendant's arguments. 3 4 
The defendant unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus relief in fed-
eral district court. 3 5 The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 
holding that the failure of the police to inform the defendant of the 
attorney's call had fatally tainted the waiver of his Miranda 
rights. 3 6 The First Circuit found it unnecessary to address the sixth 
and fourteenth amendment arguments and based its decision en-
tirely upon the fifth amendment. 3 7 The United States Supreme 
Court, in an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, reversed the First 
Circuit's decision.3 8 
B. United States Supreme Court 
The Court stated a waiver of fifth amendment rights is valid as a 
matter of law when it has been determined "a suspect's decision not 
to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he 
could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of 
the state's intention to use his statements to secure a conviction." 3 9 
The Court had no doubt that the defendant knowingly and volun-
tarily waived his right to remain silent and to the presence of coun-
sel. 4 0 The record clearly showed the police did not resort to any sort 
of physical or psychological pressure to elicit the statements. 4 1 Ad-
ditionally, the record reflected that the defendant fully compre-
hended his rights under Miranda and the potential consequences of 
a waiver of his rights. 4 2 
The defendant argued he was deprived of knowledge essential to 
make a knowing and intelligent waiver because he was not informed 
of his attorney's efforts to contact him and because the police mis-
3 1 id. 
3 3 State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d 22, 24 (R.I . 1982). 
3 3 Id. at 22. 
3 4 Id. at 31. 
3 6 Burbine v. Moran, 589 F. Supp. 1245 (D.R.I. 1984), rev'd, 753 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 
1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986). 
3 8 Burbine v. Moran, 753 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1 135 (1986). 
3 7 753 F.2d at 178. 
3 8 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1148. 
3 9 Id. at 1142. 
4 0 Id. at 1141. 
4 1 Id. 
4 2 Id. 
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informed his attorney. 4 3 The Court reasoned that a person's capac-
ity to comprehend and knowingly waive a constitutional right can-
not depend upon events which are unknown to him and which occur 
outside of his presence. 4 4 
Although the Miranda decision noted that certain types of police 
"trickery" could vitiate an otherwise valid waiver, 4 5 the Moran 
Court reasoned that the failure to inform the defendant of his attor-
ney's telephone call was not the sort of "trickery" anticipated in the 
Miranda decision. Similarly, misinforming the defense attorney 
about the continuation of the interrogation was not the sort of 
"trickery" that would vitiate the waiver 4 6 The majority opinion did 
not elucidate the types of police "trickery" that might be sufficient 
to vitiate a waiver. 
The Court further determined that the state of mind of the police 
in dealing with the defendant and his attorney was irrelevant to 
whether the defendant intelligently waived his Miranda rights. The 
Court stated that "even deliberate deception of an attorney could 
not possibly affect a suspect's decision to waive his Miranda rights 
unless he were at least aware of the incident." 4 7 Although the act of 
deliberately withholding information from a suspect is "objectiona-
ble as a matter of ethics," such conduct will affect the constitu-
tional validity of the suspect's waiver of his fifth amendment rights 
only if "it deprives a [suspect] of knowledge essential to his ability 
to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of 
abandoning them." 4 8 
The Court reaffirmed that Miranda warnings are not themselves 
constitutional rights, but rather, are measures to ensure that the 
suspect's right against compulsory self-incrimination is protected. 
Thus, their objective is not to mold police conduct or mandate a 
police code of behavior wholly unconnected to any federal right. 4 9 
The Court next considered the defendant's alternative argument 
that Miranda should be extended to prohibit the police officers' de-
ceptive conduct. Relying on policy considerations, the Court re-
jected a proposed requirement that police inform a suspect of an 
attorney's efforts to reach him. The Court relied heavily upon 
"[o]ne of the principal advantages" 5 0 of the Miranda warn-
ings—the "ease and clarity of its application." 5 1 The Court believed 
that the defendant's proposed modification would spawn numerous 
new legal questions 5 2 and would undermine the decision's central 
48 Id. 
44 Id. 
46 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476. 
46 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1142. 
4' Id. 
48 Id. 
44 Id. at 1143. 
80 Id. (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 430 (1984)). 
81 Id. 
8 1 The Court listed some legal questions which might arise if it were to adopt a rule 
requiring that the police inform a suspect that an attorney has been retained on his behalf. 
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"virtue of informing police and prosecutors with specificity . . . 
what they may do in conducting [a] custodial interrogation, and of 
informing courts under what circumstances statements obtained 
during such interrogation are not admissible." 5 3 
In addition to the problem of clarity in the application of the 
Miranda warnings, the Court reasoned that extending Miranda to 
require the police to inform a suspect of an attorney's efforts to 
reach him would work a "substantial" and "inappropriate shift in 
the subtle balance struck in that decision." 5 4 Competing concerns 
are present in every custodial interrogation. The court must weigh 
"the need for police questioning as a tool for effective enforcement 
of criminal laws" 5 5 against the inherently coercive atmosphere of 
custodial interrogations. 5 6 
The Moran Court noted that the Miranda Court, while attempt-
ing to establish a balance of these competing concerns, failed to 
adopt the more extreme position proposed by the American Civil 
Liberties Union, which would have required the actual presence of 
an attorney at every custodial interrogation in order to dispel the 
inherent coercion. 5 7 Instead, the Miranda Court struck a balance 
that allows police to continue an interrogation as long as a suspect 
clearly understands the rights he is waiving. 5 8 
The Moran Court apparently believed that extending Miranda in 
any manner would serve to destabilize the balance struck between 
society's need to capture and convict criminals and an individual's 
right to be free of coercion in custodial interrogations. In the 
Court's opinion, "full comprehension of the rights to remain silent 
and request an attorney are sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is 
inherent in the interrogation process." 5 9 The Court stated that "a 
rule requiring the police to inform a suspect of an attorney's efforts 
to contact him would contribute to the protection of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege only incidentally, if at a l l , " 6 0 and further 
stated it "would come at a substantial cost to society's legitimate 
For example, the Court questioned: 
To what extent should the police be held accountable for knowing that the 
accused has counsel? Is it enough that someone in the station house knows, or 
must the interrogating officer himself know of counsel's efforts to contact the 
suspect? Do counsel's efforts to talk to the suspect concerning one criminal 
investigation trigger the obligation to inform the defendant before interrogation 
may proceed on a wholly separate matter? 
Id. 
8 3 Id. at 1143-44 (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979)). 
5 4 Id. at 1144. 
5 5 Id. (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973)). 
8 6 The Court has previously recognized that custodial interrogations are inherently co-
ercive, creating a substantial risk that police officers will inadvertently cross the fine line 
between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compul-
sion. Id. at 1144 (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984)). 
87 Id. 
8 8 Id. See also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
474. 
8 9 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1144. 
8 0 Id. 
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and substantial interest in securing admissions of guilt ." 6 1 
I V . ANALYSIS 
A. The Fifth Amendment 
The Miranda Court recognized the inherently coercive atmo-
sphere surrounding custodial interrogations, stating "the very fact 
of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty 
and trades on the weakness of individuals." 6 2 The government has 
the burden of proving the validity of a waiver of Miranda rights 8 3 
and should not be able to meet this burden when they have with-
held information from the suspect 6 4 regarding the attorney's at-
tempt to contact h im. 6 5 
The Moran decision is contrary to prior decisions of most state 
courts that have considered this issue. 6 6 The Court thus rejected 
many carefully reasoned state decisions that have come to the oppo-
site conclusion. 6 7 The majority's opinion also clearly disregards the 
American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice, 6 8 
which recommend that a person in custody should be placed in 
communication with a lawyer at the earliest possible opportunity. 6 9 
The majority rejected this position in spite of the American Bar 
Association's expressed concerns about the potential effect of a con-
trary rule in police stations around the country. 7 0 
81 Id. 
8 2 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455. 
8 3 "Since the State is responsible for establishing the isolated circumstances under 
which the interrogation takes place and has the only means of making available corrobo-
rated evidence of warnings given during incommunicado interrogation, the burden is 
rightly on its shoulders." Id. at 475; see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 383, 404 
(1977). 
** This Note does not examine the police officers' misinforming the attorney under the 
fifth amendment because Miranda is designed to guard against violations of the suspect's 
rights and not against violations of the attorney's rights. 
6 8 Since the Court's decision in Moran, some state courts have failed to follow its ra-
tionale. See. e.g., People v. Holland, 147 111. App. 3d 323, 497 N.E.2d 1230 (1986) (the 
Illinois Supreme Court's holding in People v. Smith, 93 111. 2d 179, 442 N.E.2d 1325 
(1982), that police have a duty to inform a defendant undergoing custodial interrogation 
when an attorney is seeking to advise him, and that any confession obtained must be 
suppressed if they fail to do so, remains good law under state constitution); see also People 
v. Houston, 42 Cal. 3d 595, 724 P.2d 1166, 230 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1986) (a suspect who has 
waived his Miranda rights must be allowed to reconsider if his attorney shows up at the 
place of interrogation and offers assistance, and the police must interrupt the interrogation 
and ask the suspect whether or not he wants to confer with his attorney, and they may not 
deliberately mislead or delay the attorney in his efforts to reach the client). 
88 See Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1159 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
6 7 The American Bar Association has summarized the relevant state case law on this 
subject. See id. at 1151 n.10. 
68 Id. at 1151. 
89 Id. at 1151-52 n.l 1 (quoting A B A STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 5-7.1 (2d 
ed. 1980)). 
7 0 Id. at 1152. 
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Prior to the Moran decision, the Supreme Court of Oregon was 
one of the state courts to have reached an opposite conclusion on 
this issue. 7 1 In State v. Haynes,72 the Oregon court held that the 
prosecution cannot use a suspect's statements obtained during a 
custodial interrogation after the police, but not the suspect, knew 
that an attorney sought to consult with h im. 7 3 Before the police 
may proceed with the interrogation, the suspect "must be informed 
when counsel actually seeks to consult with him and must voluntar-
ily and intelligently have rejected that opportunity." 7 4 The court 
reasoned that "[t]o pass up an abstract offer to call some unknown 
lawyer is very different from refusing to talk with an identified at-
torney actually available to provide at least initial assistance and 
advice." 7 5 Perhaps what the Moran Court feared was that suspects 
will exercise their fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion after consulting with an attorney. 7 6 The Court has previously 
stated, however, that "[n]o system worth preserving should have to 
fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with his lawyer, he 
will become aware of, and exercise, these rights." 7 7 
The majority's alternative cost-benefit analysis 7 8 reflects the 
Court's fear that an individual may exercise his rights. In previous 
cases, however, the Court has favored protecting the interest in in-
dividual liberty when threatened by incommunicado interrogation. 
The Miranda Court "apparently felt that whatever the cost to soci-
ety in terms of fewer convictions of guilty suspects, that cost would 
simply have to be borne in the interest of enlarged protection for 
the Fifth Amendment privilege." 7 9 
Adoption of a rule requiring police to inform a suspect that an 
attorney has been retained for him would not destroy the balance 
achieved by the Court in the Miranda decision. Such a rule need 
not go so far as to require that counsel be present in every custodial 
interrogation. The suspect would still retain the discretion to pro-
ceed without the assistance of counsel. Additionally, the rule would 
have a limited application because it would only apply to those situ-
ations in which the police are aware that an attorney has been re-
tained for the suspect. 
By determining that police may deliberately withhold informa-
tion from a suspect, 8 0 the Court is promoting deceptive law enforce-
7 1 State v. Haynes, 288 Or . 59, 602 P.2d 272 (1979), cert, denied, 446 U.S. 945 (1980). 
7 2 Id. 
7 8 Id. at 61, 602 P.2d a t 273. 
7 4 Id. 
7 8 Id. at 72, 602 P.2d a t 278. 
7 8 The majority admitted that "[n]o doubt the additional information would have been 
useful to respondent; perhaps even it might have affected his decision to confess." Moran, 
106 S. Ct . at 1142. 
7 7 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964). 
7 8 See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text. 
7 9 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656-57 (1984). 
8 0 See Moran, 106 S. C t . at 1142. 
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ment practices. 8 1 The Court reasoned that, although "objectionable 
as a matter of ethics," such conduct will affect the constitutional 
validity of the suspect's waiver of his fifth amendment rights only if 
"it deprives a [suspect] of knowledge essential to his ability to un-
derstand the nature of his rights and the consequences of aban-
doning them." 8 2 Under this rationale, police may deliberately 
choose not to inform the suspect about the retention of counsel. The 
net result is that police are free to deceive suspects in order to carry 
on inherently coercive incommunicado interrogations. 
B. The Sixth Amendment 
Absent a valid waiver, a defendant has a sixth amendment right 
to the presence of an attorney during any interrogation occurring 
after adversarial judicial proceedings have commenced. 8 3 In Moran, 
the interrogations occurred before the initiation of adversarial judi-
cial proceedings. 8 4 
The defendant, nevertheless, argued that, although adversarial 
judicial proceedings had not commenced, the "right to the noninter-
ference with an attorney's dealing with a criminal suspect . . . 
arises the moment that the relationship is formed." 8 6 The Court re-
jected this theory and found that as a clear matter of precedent, its 
decisions "foreclose any reliance on . . . the proposition that the 
Sixth Amendment right, in any of its manifestations, applies prior 
to the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings." 8 6 
The Moran Court correctly disposed of the defendant's sixth 
amendment arguments. Since adversarial judicial proceedings had 
not yet commenced against the defendant, his sixth amendment 
rights had not attached at the time in question. Since his rights had 
not yet attached, he had no basis to argue that they were violated. 
8 1 " [A] system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the 'confession' 
will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which 
depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation." Esco-
bedo, 378 U.S. at 489 (citations omitted); see also Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 
519 (1962) ("Official misconduct cannot but breed disrespect for law, as well as for those 
charged with its enforcement."); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960) ("The 
abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions . . . also turns on the deep-
rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law . . . .") (quoting 
Spanov. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959)). 
" Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1142. 
8 3 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977). 
8 4 Adversarial judicial proceedings commence when prosecution is undertaken by way 
of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment. Moran, 
106 S. Ct . at 1145 (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187 (1984)). 
88 Id. 
8 6 Id. 
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C. The Fourteenth Amendment 
The defendant challenged the police officers' conduct under the 
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, focusing on their 
communicating false information to his attorney. 8 7 The Court dis-
missed the claim, stating merely that "the challenged conduct falls 
short of the kind of misbehavior that so shocks the sensibilities of 
civilized society as to warrant a federal intrusion into the criminal 
processes of the states." 8 8 The Court noted, however, that "on facts 
more egregious than those presented here police deception might 
rise to a level of a due process violation."8 9 
The summary disposition of the due process issue is unusual. 
Without analysis, the Court simply stated that its conscience was 
not shocked. Prior Supreme Court decisions, however, have given 
more careful consideration to the requirements of due process.9 0 
The Court in Moran should have given the same careful considera-
tion to this issue. 
V . CONCLUSION 
In Moran, the Court addressed police officers' withholding of in-
formation from a suspect concerning an attorney's efforts to contact 
him, and officers' misinforming the attorney about the continuation 
of interrogations, under the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amend-
ments. The sixth amendment right to counsel issue was correctly 
disposed of in Moran because adversarial judicial proceedings had 
not yet commenced at the time in question. 9 1 The Court, however, 
should continue to measure confessions against due process require-
ments as it has previously done, and not as it did in Moran.92 Fi-
nally, the fifth amendment privilege should be interpreted to require 
police to inform a suspect that an attorney has been retained for 
him. 9 3 
Adoption of a rule that police must inform a suspect of the reten-
tion of counsel for him would not destroy the balance achieved by 
the Court in Miranda. Furthermore, such a rule would also be con-
sistent with the decisions of most of the states that have considered 
this issue. By determining, however, that police may deliberately 
withhold information from a suspect, the Court is promoting decep-
tive law enforcement practices. 
8 7 Id. at 1147. 
8 8 Id. at 1148. 
8 9 Id. at 1147. 
8 0 See, e.g., Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. 634 (1986) (use of petitioner's post-
arrest, post-Miranda warnings silence as evidence of his sanity violated due process). 
9 1 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. 
9 2 See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text. 
9 a See supra notes 62-82 and accompanying text. 
